# Proceedings OF THE INTERNATIONAL VIRTUAL CONFERENCE

PASTORAL CARE WITHOUT BORDERS

(Migration, social change, educational deficiencies, global pandemic)

Fiecare autor va răspunde de autenticitatea studiului din acest volum

OVIDIUS UNIVERSITY OF CONSTANTA

FACULTY OF THEOLOGY

Coordinators:

Assist. PhD. Protos. Maxim Marian Vlad

Lecturer. PhD. Nina Stănescu

Lecturer. PhD. Florentina Olimpia Avram

Proceedings OF THE INTERNATIONAL

VIRTUAL CONFERENCE

PASTORAL CARE WITHOUT BORDERS

(Migration, social change, educational deficiencies, global pandemic)

Redactor: Gheorghe Iovan
Tehnoredactor: Ameluţa Vişan
Coperta: Monica Balaban

CUPRINS

FOREWORD

This conference, suggestively entitled: Pastoral care without borders (Migration, social change, educational deficiencies, global pandemic), held on October 29, 2020, is occasioned by the fact that 2021 was declared by the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church as "The Homage Year of the pastoral care of the Romanians from outside Romania". The decision of the Holy Synod is all the more natural, as the OSCE has stated that the Romanian diaspora is one of the most numerous, currently occupying the fifth place at the international level.

Romanians, wherever they may be, are an integral part of the country's social body and members of the Orthodox Church, and the state together with the Romanian Orthodox Church are invited to respond equally to the needs, interests and concerns of those at home and abroad. According to estimates, between 3.5 and 4 million Romanians have settled abroad. Of these, more than 2.8 million live in another EU member state.

At least three main waves of emigration can be distinguished: a first such wave left the Romanian territories at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, heading, especially, towards North America, a second one represented the political exile during the dictatorship. and the third one, after 1989, initially formed by young professionals and later by other Romanians, motivated by economic or career opportunities and who arrived mainly in Europe.

The Romanian Patriarchate and the Ministry for Romanians Abroad signed on Tuesday, July 17, 2018, a new collaboration protocol. The collaboration protocol envisages a series of projects, programs and actions that aim to support the Romanian communities abroad in order to preserve their ethnic, cultural and religious identity.

Thus, the joint efforts for the benefit of Romanian communities everywhere are regulated through the construction, repair, conservation and endowment of churches, libraries and museums, through the renovation and maintenance of memorial houses, historical monuments and cemeteries.

The preservation, protection and revitalization of Romanian traditions and customs will be supported by organizing in the country and abroad cultural events for Romanians everywhere, through educational projects, as

well as by strengthening the educational, spiritual and identity role of Romanian Orthodox parishes and monasteries abroad.

The conference, which addresses a valuable and generous topic through its content, betrays the interest of participants, professors and researchers in the field of theology and humanities, for the issue raised by the ways in which the spiritual and social life of Romanians abroad is managed. Researchers are trying, according to their own skills, to provide keys of interpretation and solutions to the challenges faced by Romanian migrants in a global society, hit today by the health crisis triggered by the covid pandemic19.

Assist. Ph.D. Protos. Maxim Vlad

A POSITIVE IMAGE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION (NOT ONLY) WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Prof. Ph.D. Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló OP

Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas "Angelicum", Faculty of Social sciences, **Rome, Italy**

ABSTRACT

"Today, the problem of nationalities is placed in a new world horizon, characterized by a strong ´mobility´, which makes the same ethnic-cultural boundaries of the various peoples less and less marked, under the pressure of multiple dynamics such as migration, the mass media, and the globalization of the economy." These words say a great pope of the twentieth century John Paul II in his speech to the United Nations, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the organization in the Palace of the United Nations on October 5, 1995 [1]. This event took place in the mid-1990s, at a time when the European Union was being further enlarged (e.g. Austria), when many spoke of the redundancy of nations and nation states (as if nations were simply remnants of the past.

In recent days, when the second wave of the COVID-19 virus pandemic began, many European intellectuals question the common future of Europe and the European Union. In this period, 31 years after the fall of communism and 16 years of an important enlargement of the European Union [2] (for many states of Central and Eastern Europe), it was a period of prosperity and cooperation for the whole of Europe and a globalized world, we have seen again the emergence of nationalist, nationalist or even populist ideas. A fairly large part of this spectrum, influenced by various quasi-information from Internet networks and a certain loss of security and previous traditions, supports an isolationist approach to national thinking, in which a nation is something homogeneous, firm and immutable. However, a smaller portion of the spectrum indicates the insolubility of the nation, even when the dream of the European state was realised. In this second stream belongs today a holy graduate of our University John Paul II and his court philosopher, Józef Tischner [3].

Keywords: pastoral care, migration, European union, identity, nation.

INTRODUCTION

Rights of nations like a part of human rights

Nevertheless, first let us look at the resources with which we came to the demonstration of John Paul II, who inspired Tischner. The speech of John Paul II. at the United Nations, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the organization separately alerted Austrian academic Friedrich Romig, who during the campaign to join the European Union in 1992-1994 was the representative of the Diocese of St. Pölten and member of the European Commission of the Austrian Bishops' Conference [4].

Romig begins his book with the idea of this speech that General Declaration of Human Rights speaks of personal rights, but that there is no similar agreement on the "rights of nations"[4]. It is on this anthropological foundation that the "rights of nations" are also based, which are nothing more than the "human rights" that are grasped at this specific level of community life [1].

Romig continues that with the idea of John Paul II that every people wants to become a nation [4]. According to him the idea of the nation has a supra-individual and timeless character, which brings together the individual and the community, the past and the future, time and eternity, past, present and future generations in their work on the cultural heritage that the nation "embodies" and thus leaves "going to the blood" of the members of the nation [4]. Tischner says energetically that one cannot participate in the historical and cultural heritage except through the human community and the nation. The legacy that man shapes, influences and coordinates his destiny. Therefore, belonging to the nation, to which man is grateful for his cultural identity, is one of the fundamental human rights [4].

The nation cannot be labelled more completely than Hegel's "objective spirit", because it exists independently of individuals, while every individual in the nation is emerging spiritually. In the national character, in the forms of life, habits, customs and traditions, says Messner, "people live together as a community, live through institutional ties and allow the world of the soul of their community to last for generations. It achieves its coexistence in a common destiny and a living memory of a history and common personalities with whom they feel called to common ideals [4]". This living memory is very important against the lack of Memory of new generations today like describe in his book and in his topic prof. Verovšek [5].

Our holy alumni of the Angelicum, saint John-Paul II, is aware of the danger of strengthening the idea of the nation in nationalism, which gives other nations the right to life, or even suppresses that right by violence. The concept of nation has a "relational" character for him. It can only be understood by what distinguishes its nation from other peoples, but also from what they associate [1]. Tischner and John Paul II see in each nation a "personality", which is distinguished by its uniqueness and therefore borders on all other nations. Only because peoples

bind and differentiate themselves can they be associated and respect each other's autonomy [4].

And so nations have not only rights but also duties: "the most important of them is the obligation to live with other peoples in the spirit of peace, respect and solidarity". The nation that aspires to rob another nation of freedom is not free. Nations unite the mutual recognition of the right to freedom and cultural development [1].

The first right of the nation is the right to exist. This right also includes the right to one's own language and culture through which people express themselves and support what John Paul II has called the mental sovereignty of each nation. Every nation has the right to make life according to its own habits and to build its own future and to educate the younger generations. It is precisely through the recognition of the rights of the nation that an "explosive desire for identification and survival" and a "kind of counter-balancing against the trend of unification" is considered [1].

From people through nation to patria

Tischner in his comment of the message of John Paul II distinguishes [4]:

1. community of peoples (people are particular, tied to place and time, closed to themselves-rejecting all the strange; but also: the place where universality has manifested itself for the first time in an emotional way through which we discover the truth of life, which, under the influence of rationalism, has fallen into oblivion and rebirth by romance) [3].

2. the nation (it belongs to the sphere of culture consciously gripped and receptive),

3. the homeland (motherland).

However, Tischer notes that everything we say about the "nation" is certain that it belongs to the sphere of culture and not to "nature". No one is "born" as Polish, German or French. Man "becomes" Polish, German or French when he enters the "historical reality" of his "nation" [3].

Above the ethnic-cultural meaning of the nation is finally the homeland that should be understood not as a set of obligations but rather as a set of rights to its protection and defence, even at the cost of property and life itself [3]. Tischner adds that the homeland is a great collective obligation. Communion for the fulfilment of collective obligations must come from within, from the heart where the feeling of the homeland is based. The homeland is the intended destination of the state.

Saint John Paul II knows that the Church, which is no longer rooted in individual peoples, is drying up and losing the power that shapes life. Now the Church is no longer "soul", nor "living principle", not even "heart" of the culture of the nation. But when it ceases to be a heart, the nation spreads along with the Church in the "world society"[4].

For Tischner, national hope begins with the "people". But the "people" is not the "nation" [3]. Thought determined by hope discovers the "people" as the "substance" of the nation. It does not describe "the people as a people", but describes the "people" through what they can become. The "people" must be "heard" by the "nation". However, this is not a universal approach. There are ideologies that prefer to see that the "people" remains the "people" forever. Tischner says that John Paul II in his message does not subject the concept of the "people" to a more in-depth analysis, but deals above all with the nation and its rights. However, it is not inappropriate to speak of certain "tensions" that permeate the "responsible people" [3].

The "people" is something that is "overcome" ("suppressed"?), to which one can and must, however, always connect again. The nature of the "people" is determined by the tension that permeates it. The "people" is "particular", linked to place and time, closed in on itself and repulsive "strangers", at the same time it is the place, where the universal expresses itself for the first time. However, in the transcendental experience of the "responsible people" the first is not the "I", but the "we". One broke the costume, abandoned the "sacred" costume, forgot his "roots" and in this way placed his selfish "I" above the others. Another one "accepted" the "people" and raised their culture to the level of a "national culture". The "responsible people" is revealed to us as that which is constantly outdated, but which is always present in this act of overcoming [3].

The "people" live in their "world". The world of the "people" is the "world of life". The key to the "world of life" is the experience of "life". Life" is not a term, but the fullness of the immediate: cold and heat, tiredness and freshness, sleep and vigilance, youth and old age, cohesion with family members, desire, sadness, expectation, birth and death [3].

For Tischner, the modern discovery of the "people" is undoubtedly a work of romanticism. He saw in the "people" the bearer of the "truth" about life, which fell into oblivion under the influence of cold rationalism. The "truth" to which the "people" have access has an emotional character. It's usually a tragic truth. The life of the "people" is a consequence of defeats. Of course, the "people" has its joys, but above all it is the incarnation of the last "misfortune" of life [3].

Tischner says that for Trentowski, the "people" is above all what does not know the experience of freedom. The "people" goes "to the mercy of necessity". His slavery consists above all in the slavery of the forces of nature. Nor does it know the sufferings that the consciousness of freedom brings with it. His "Eden" is above all a "Garden of Innocence". After the slavery of nature comes the slavery of others - of the "gentlemen" [3]. This name is similar to that described by Hegel: social slavery from the "Lord" that the servant had suffered, is the social manifestation of slavery by "death" - the "absolute Lord" that man had suffered as part of nature. That is why people need a "helmsman" to guide them. The helmsman is above all the enlightened nobility, the aristocracy. But when the "people" become aware of their freedom, they become part of the "nation" [3].

Tischner reaches Trentowski's idea of the "chosen nation": "Jehovah faithfully served the tribe of the Levites, that is, the presbyterate; other Israeli tribes left him again and again and, not having instructed the command and following the instinct of the souls of the people, reached the Assyrian calves". Jehovah was the God of the nation, strictly speaking the God of the helmsman, and not the God of the Jewish people. When the desire came to make it popular, the superstitious Kabala, from which the Jews joined, rose immediately [3, 6].

It seems that in this situation the key term that opens the door to the "mystery of the people" is "lot" or "skill". The "people" has their "fate"; since they cannot be changed, the people must learn to bear their fate patiently [3].

However, for Trentowski the "people" is the "queen cell" of the nation. The "nation" goes from the "queen cell". The door is the experience of freedom. Thanks to freedom, the "people" have "melted" behind them. But it's not about that "freedom" that takes refuge in individualism, but about that which discovers a superior type of community: the national community. Two experiences are crucial: becoming an owner and being willing to sacrifice one's life for others. The number of owners in the country must be significantly increased so that new owners can use their lives to fight for freedom. Because only the "owner" can become a free "citizen", only the "citizen" can grow beyond the "people" and voluntarily die "for Poland" as a member of the "nation"[3].

The wrong idea of the people putting themselves over a nation

He would not be a Polish philosopher and intellectual if Tischner had not pointed to the destructive environment of communism based on Marx-Leninism. It should be stressed, says Tischner, however, that John Paul II also knows another tradition of thinking of the "people", who came from the French Revolution, who shaped the reality of "popular Poland" through Marxism and communist ideology. In what sense was "popular Poland" really "popular" (or "responsible people")? In the language of the communist ideology, the "people" was not and could not be the "queen cell" of the nation. It should rather remain the "people". The basic idea was that the "nation" should be "surpassed" by the "people" and merge with its "raw material"[3].

Tischner continues that the misfortune of the "people", as the young Marx wrote, is based on alienation from the "nature of man". The main concerns of the "people" are the satisfaction of the common needs of man and animals: to satisfy hunger and thirst, protection from cold and heat, the need to stay. The suffering of the "people" provided the basic legitimacy for the "revolutionary rule". "Popular Poland" was in the sense of "responsible people" when it cultivated the "suffering of the people" with particular sensitivity. The "unfortunate" were his raison d'être. In the early phase of communism, the idea of "responsible people" could of course play a positive role in the definition of state social policy. But it soon led to the formation of a vicious circle: instead of fighting misery, the communist government needed misery so that the "miserable" and the "unfortunate" could justify their continuation. This ambivalent relationship with misery has made them

evident in times of crisis. As soon as the communist regime found itself in a crisis situation, it resorted to "social sediment" to seek "misery" and to support itself in it [3].

However, Tischner reaches, the "people" cannot be only the "people". This does not allow him to feel responsible. You can't be happy and unhappy at the same time. The I escapes the "popular responsibility of us", but in what direction? In a pure "internationalism" or in the direction of a new "we" - a national "we"?

The key question for Tischner that arises from previous experiences with the "people" and the "nation" seems to be this: can the "nation" be circumvented in the passage from the "I" to the "we" - from the particular to the universal? Theoretically, it seems possible. If the nation is a work of culture and not of nature, then a simple and far-reaching transition from the "clinging people" to the "generally human" is conceivable. This leap was proposed by "Popular Communism". His ideal was the "brotherhood of peoples" - not of nations [3].

Culture of ethical and moral union to become a nation

But then you have to ask for the costs. To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify, what is the "nation". The experience of the "nation" is still closely linked to the experience of human identity. Tischner asked himself the questions: How can a person who has not found his identity at the level of the "people" find it at the level of the "nation"? Which experiences, which impressions are decisive for this? His answer is that the "nation" is above all the decision for a culture.

However, what are the conditions for the possibility of "nation"? Let's start with terminological explanations. Anyone who says "naród" thinks less about blood ties than about cultural ties whose core is ethical heritage – "good manners" in the deepest sense of the term. One of the most important links that make up the "nation" is the language. But it's not so much about words that sound the same as it is about the content that members of a nation communicate with each other without using words. There is a close connection between the word "naród" and "homeland". Being in the "Homeland" means being home. But this is not possible without a choice. You have a "homeland" (paternal plaice - the house), you can get a "homeland", but you can also choose a "homeland". Thanks to the moment of choice, "nation" and "homeland" become ethical values. As such, they build an "ethical duty".

Norwid defined the "nation" in the following words: "(.... .) the homeland is a great collective duty - a devoir collectif " [3, 7]. On the contrary, with Norwid's help he tries to combine the emerging idea of the nation as a collective duty with that of the communist ideology which for a long time has been the background for the papal reflection on the nation. Without considering this background we could not fully understand the thought of John Paul II [3].

For him the tradition as developed during the Polish division, the "nation" is not a mere "superstructure" of socio-economic conditions, as the communists have always said, but the result of certain electoral acts, immersed in certain

experiences of the past and hopes for the future. The "nation" chooses something that in a sense already is, but without the choice would remain dead and ineffective.

First of all, it is important to choose. The circumstances of these elections are sometimes very dramatic. Tischner says there was a war in which Poles faced each other on both sides (as enemies). There's been a disturbance. There was a demonstration in Honor of the Constitution of May 3, 1791. Which way should you take? The choice is the choice of a past, but it is made in the perspective of a future. Undoubtedly, as Heidegger says, it is a "repetition". Repetition of the past has an essential meaning for the future [3, 8].

Finally, with the election completed, the "I" enters into a relationship with the "we". It's Tischner you ask the next question: What is this relationship? It's not just about the "I'm with others" or "I'm next to others" relationship. "We" is a relationship of mutual responsibility. Norwid also wrote: "For the homeland - the compatriots -, it is a moral union without which there are no parties, without which the parties are comparable to gangs or polemical camps, whose focus is discord and whose reality is the smoke of words [3, 9].

The "moral union" is an association based on the relationship "one for the others", "the others for one" (Levinas). Such an intense relationship contains a heroic intention. It means a willingness to sacrifice one's life for others. But it also means the will to kill others - the enemies of the nation – "for your and our freedom". The national ethos contains an ambiguity which, based only on this ethos, cannot apparently be excluded.

In the Middle Ages, the cult of national heroes and national saints became an expression of heroic intention. Let's give the floor to the historian: "The lack of national cults in Germany and Italy has undoubtedly influenced the course of national crystallization processes. Numerous local cults, strongly developed there, have promoted particularism. The Polish reader immediately recalls the role of the cult of St. Adalbert (Wojciech) in the first phase of the existence of the Polish state and especially the cult of St. Stanislaus in the process of the rebirth of the state in the 13th-14th centuries. In León and Castile, Saint James the Apostle (Santiago) became a national saint; his relics in Compostela had a reputation that was close to that of Saint Peter's tomb and attracted flocks of pilgrims. The kings of Castile (Caesar of Spain) traded as "knights" (milites) or "standard-bearers" (vexillifers) of St. James [3].

The crystallization of the nation in its ethos leads to "participation" in the ideal. The logic of the drama is convincing. The nation is increasingly becoming the embodiment of the "national ideal". And once again we can observe this in the example of the relationship with written law. In the Middle Ages, writes Zientara, it was a very important element of the individuality of the nation, the right. It was one of the factors whose development was not limited to the narrow upper class of the "political nation", but was deeply rooted in the masses, because medieval law developed organically from the oldest tribal rights and did not tolerate sudden changes. Attempts to codify it from above have also often proved unsuccessful, and

attempts to introduce elements of Roman law met with resistance in the late Middle Ages. If the conquests of the medieval monarchs provoked resistance from the subjugated population down to the lower classes, its causes should not be sought exclusively in the acts of violence of the conquerors. The introduction of foreign law or changes in the organisation of the judiciary and the functioning of the courts has usually caused strong resistance [3, 10].

More complicated are the relations between the national ethos (the "custom") and the law written in a country that does not have its own state. The applicable law is branded from the outset as "foreign" and "hostile". Its binding character is marked from the outset by a question mark. It opposes idealized national ethos or previous applicable law. The previous law in force in Poland during the division was the "Constitution of 3 May". Even the idealized national ethos played a huge role. It was based on the premise that all evil came from slavery, because slavery meant above all slavery to the "good will" of Poland [3].

An essential element of national consciousness is the relationship with "others" – "foreigners", "enemies". The concept of 'injuring animals' should be introduced into the definition of this report. "The foreigner is not just the other. A foreigner is also someone who has done me an injustice. On the other hand, it is part of the "nature" of national consciousness to define a positive relationship with "others". Norwid rightly wrote: "(...) European nations must possess their complete personality to a greater extent than other complete personalities, because the personality banned from solitude is not yet complete, and only through contact with others does it mature in its essence. This is so true that those who would say that the nation is composed not only of what distinguishes it from others, but also of what unites it with others, would say at the same time that the strength of this solidarity is by no means a concession and does not break the nation, but rather an attribute of the perfection of character and of a positive quality [3, 9]".

Here we meet an important moment of the idea of "nation": in the very concept of "nation", in its "essence" there is a reference to others; the concept of "nation" has a relational character - it does not reject others, but only together with the others it acquires its full meaning. E.-W. Böckenförde cites an example from Poland before the divisions: when asked who was someone, one could get the following answer: Canonicus cracoviensis, natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus, originale Judaeus [3,11].

The "unifying force" contained in the concept of "nation" has been expressed in different ways. At the time of the Polish national uprisings it was expressed in the slogan "for your and our freedom". The rebels did not fight against another nation but against tyranny, which oppressed "others" as much as its "own". There was a general belief that a nation seeking to deprive another nation of its freedom was not free. The idea of freedom and national sovereignty has taken on universal significance. It left its mark on the concept of the nation state. This state, if it were to be an expression of the national ethos, could not be directed against the "others" [1, 3].

Sharing the ethical ideal, participation, leads to the discovery of one's own identity. John Paul II. speaks clearly of it: "It is (......) a bursting need for identity and survival, a sort of counterweight to the homologating tendencies" [3].

Tischner notes that Charles Taylor points out in his valuable studies on "European identity", that the concept of "self", i.e. personal identity, is closely linked to the concept (of experience) of "good". We are not able to clarify the experiences of our identity "until we better understand how our image of good has evolved" [3, 11]. Taylor's thought is an excellent illustration of the development of national consciousness: from the "I" to the "We" passing through the choice of a responsibility within the legacy of the past, inspired by a certain hope. Sometimes this development is called "liberation". The "liberation" of national consciousness means that "something" is not born of "nothing", but "born" from the depths of the unconscious. The nation "in itself" becomes the "nation for itself".

At the same time, however, the dangers of this process have become evident: the idealization of one's own nation, the temptation to take revenge on injustices suffered or presumed, the legitimation of the shedding of foreign blood as well as one's own, the separation of the "unifying" dimension from the national idea - all this creates the dangers of "nationalism". How to avoid these dangers [3]?

CONCLUSION

The nation as the work of culture against nationalism and totalitarianism

Tischner reaches that if the "nation" is a product and a continuation of a culture, then the work on the culture and its condition is at the same time work on the "national ethos". The current situation he seems very worrying. John Paul II's speech contains critical observations on the condition of modern culture. He cites utilitarianism, relativism and scepticism, while the special object of his criticism is nationalism, which is an ideological justification for the violence that one nation makes to another. Nationalism denies others every right [1].

Extreme nationalism can lead to totalitarianism. Occasionally, nationalism tries to rely on religion, "as", says the Pope, unfortunately, in some phenomena, so-called fundamentalism "occurs". Patriotism, however, differs from nationalism in that it consists of "just love for one's own country". Nationalism and other deviations from ideology can only be overcome by a return to the foundations of culture, especially the rightly understood idea of freedom and truth [1].

The criticism of utilitarianism, relativism and scepticism is "pragmatic". Instead of discovering the inner contradictions of theories, he wonders about the consequences of attitudes. Even if none of the theories mentioned approve of totalitarian ideologies, they, seen as social attitudes, are not able to prevent totalitarianism. Where violence begins to dominate social life, resistance to it arises from attitudes based on "freedom and truth". This is the lesson we can learn from historical experience. John Paul II affirms that freedom is "the measure of human dignity and greatness" and "a great challenge for the spiritual growth of man". We must use it responsibly. Freedom, it is said, "is ordered to the truth and is realized

in the search and in doing the truth. Detached from the truth of the human person, it decays into the life of the individual in the licentiousness and political life of the arbitrariness of the strongest and most presumed rulers"[1].

For Tischner, the concern arises at this point: haven't totalitarian ideologies proclaimed something similar? Did they not initially claim to be in possession of the truth and then resort to coercive measures to ensure that people "live according to the truth"? What does the word "truth" mean in John Paul II [3]?

John Paul II says: "Therefore, far from being a limitation or a threat to freedom, the reference to the truth about man - a truth universally known through the moral law inscribed in the heart of each person - is, in reality, the guarantee of the future of freedom [1]. These words refer to the words of Saint Paul (Rom 2:15), which refer to the law "inscribed in the heart of man". John Paul II interprets this law as "natural law".

Natural law is also the foundation of "human rights". In this way, the reflection concludes: the rights of the nation are "nothing but" the "human rights" cultivated at this particular level of community life. The Pope adds: A reflection on these rights is certainly not easy, given the difficulty of defining the very concept of "nation", which is not identified a priori and necessarily with the State. It is, however, an unavoidable reflection if we want to avoid the mistakes of the past and provide for a just world order[1].

Of course, the speech of Saint John Paul II did not solve all the problems related to the treatment of nations and their rights. However, it has touched on issues so fundamental that it has become a powerful incentive to continue working on this issue for a very future of the European collaboration e better function of the European Union without a hybrid regime [13].

REFERENCES

[1]   ***MESSAGE OF YOUNG PAUL II TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE 50th FUNDATION* United Nations Palace in New York Thursday, 5 October 1995 , Tipografia Vaticana, Rome (L´Osservatore Romano, 25 anno, N°41, 13. October 1995), on the internet: https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1995/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_05101995_address-to-uno.html., Art. 7.

[2]   *** Buttiglione, Europa è finita?, https://youtu.be/Gx8LkvJ8Doc.

[3]   Tischner J., Die Nation und ihre Rechte. Einführung in die Ansprache Johannes Pauls II. vor den Vereinten Nationen im Oktober 1995, in: Krzysztof Michalski (ed.): Aufklärung heute (traslation Friedrich Griese), Castel-Gandolfo-Gespräche 1996, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1997, pp. 122-145.

[4]   Romig F., Die Rechte der Nation. Leopold Stocker Verlag (2002), trans. Peter Kubica for the publisher Spolok slovenských spisovateľov, Bratislava under the title: Práva Národa, 2008, art. 6, 8-11.

[5]   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMIrrNYTER4&feature=youtu.be. Peter Verovšek (University of Sheffield) talked about the role of war recollection in European integration. Historian Herman Van Goethem, rector of the University of Antwerp, responded to his talk.

[6]   Trentowski B., Czy można uczyć filozofii narodowej od ludu i jakie cechy cechy cechy cechy should taz filozofia, "Rok", 1845, H. 3, p. 22-32. Citato da: 700 lat myśli polskiej, selezionato da A. Walicki, Warszawa 1977, p. 273.

[7]   Norwid C., Memorial on Young Emigration, in: A. Walicki (ed.): 700 years of Polish thought. Warsaw 1977, p. 656.

[8]   Heidegger M., Sein und Zeit, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, in: A. Walicki (ed.): 1977, p. 385.

[9]   Norwid C., Głos niedawno do wychodźstwa polskiego przybyonego artistry, 700 years of Polish thought. Warsaw 1977, p. 333.

[10]   Zientara B., Dawn of European Nations, Warsaw 1996, p. 333.

[11]   Böckenförde E.-W., The Nation - Identity in Difference, in: K. Michalski (ed.), Identität im Wandel, Castelgandolfo- Gespräche, vol. VI, Stuttgart 1995, p. 159.

[12]   Taylor Ch., Sources of the Self. The Origin of Modern Identity, Frankfurt am Main 1996, p. 15.

[13]   Hvížďala Karel, Ve střední Evropě bují hybridní režimy. A unie si s tím neví rady, říká Rupnik, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/ve-stredni-evrope-buji-hybridni-rezimy-a-unie-si-s-tim-nevi/r~5743610418b411eb9d74ac1f6b220ee8/.

ATTITUDE TO YOURSELF AND OTHERS IN MENTAL INJURY

Prof. Ph. D. O. V. Zashchirinskaya[1]

Lecturer Ph. D. Barbaros Tatiana[2]

[1] Sank-Petersburg University, **Rusia**
[2] Ovidius University of Constanța, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, **Romania**

ABSTRACT

The article presents the results of a study of the characteristics of attitudes towards oneself and others in a person with experience of mental trauma. On the basis of a theoretical review, the system of relationships is considered as a key characteristic of the personality, relationships to oneself and to others as a driving force of behavior and feelings, the consequences of the particuliarities of experiencing a traumatic situation on a person's life are revealed. An empirical study was carried out on individuals with neurotic disorders (experimental group) and healthy people (control group). According to the results of psychodiagnostics, statistically significant differences were revealed between the degree of psycho-traumatization and the characteristics of the attitude towards oneself and others. The severe consequences of cumulative psycho-trauma cause manifestations of insufficient self-care, negative feelings, including isolation and alienation, confidence difficulties, victimization and revictimization on the part of other people.

Key words: mental trauma, experience of psycho-traumatization, attitude towards oneself, interpersonal relationships, the severity of mental traumatization.

INTRODUCTION

Relationships psychology is the most important section of theoretical psychology and the practical aspect of psychological support for a person in building harmonious constructive relationships. This area reveals the essence of a person's being in the world and his individual world, because the system of relations is built on three basic principles: to the world, to other people and to oneself. At the same time, the concept of "attitude" is one of the key characteristics of a person. It refers to the connection of a person with any